Efficiency versus Economy of Time in Multi-Unit Descending Auction : The Role of “Mari at Flower Markets in Japan by Kitahara, Minoru & Ogawa, Ryo
Discussion Paper No. 774 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EFFICIENCY VERSUS ECONOMY OF TIME 
IN MULTI-UNIT DESCENDING AUCTION:  
THE ROLE OF "MARI" AT FLOWER MARKETS 
IN JAPAN 
 
 
Minoru Kitahara 
Ryo Ogawa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2010 
 
 
The Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Osaka University 
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
 
Eciency versus Economy of Time in
Multi-Unit Descending Auction:
The Role of “Mari” at Flower Markets in
Japan
Minoru Kitaharay
and
Ryo Ogawaz
First Draft: February 2006
This Version: February 2010
The authors are grateful to Michihiro Kandori, Toshihiro Matsumura, Kuniyoshi
Saito, Kiri Sakahara, Daisuke Shimizu, and Takahiro Watanabe for comments and dis-
cussions. The authors are also grateful to seminar/conference participants at the 2006
Autumn Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association, the 2006 South and South-east
Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society in Chennai, and the 2008 Far Eastern Meeting
of the Econometric Society in Singapore. Financial supports from Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science are gratefully acknowledged.
yJSPS Research Fellow, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Tokyo Metropolitan Uni-
versity, 1-1 Minami-Osawa, Hachioji-shi, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan, and Visiting Research
Fellow, Advanced Research Institute for the Sciences and Humanities, Nihon University,
12-5 Goban-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-8251, Japan (mkitahar@tmu.ac.jp).
zCorresponding author. Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University,
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan (r-ogawa@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp).
1
Abstract
The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modi-
fied version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japanese
flower markets, there is an additional stage, called “mari”, where
buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the
remainder of flowers at the same price as in the previous auction. We
investigate the role of “mari” in multi-unit descending auction, and
show that “mari” extensively speeds up the market procedure at the
cost of suciently small loss of eciency, compared to the original
Dutch sequential auction.
1 Introduction
Descending price auction (or, Dutch auction) is widely used at wholesale
flower markets in countries such as the Netherlands and Japan among
others. The Dutch market is leading in the worldwide market share, and
Ota Floriculture Auction in Tokyo is the second largest1. The Dutch style
of the flower auction originates in the Netherlands (as is clear from the
name) and was imported into Japan, but in the process of adoption of the
descending style, many of flower markets in Japan, including Ota, made a
slight modification to the original rule. In this paper we call the modified
rule in Japan asmari, which comes frommarketmen’s jargon referring to the
modification. This paper investigates both advantages and disadvantages
of mari, and shows that mari extensively speeds up the market procedure
at the cost of suciently small loss of eciency, compared to the original
1Two organizations of flower auctions, Flora Holland and Aalsmeer, were competing
in the Netherlands until 2007. In 2008, Flora Holland and Aalsmeer merged, and then
Ota Floriculture in Tokyo became the second largest.
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Dutch sequential auction.2
The key instrument at those markets is the “auction clock”, beginning
with a high price which is then gradually lowered. If a buyer desires to
buy the good at the price on the clock, he pushes the button then the clock
stops. The good is won by the buyer who was the first to stop the clock,
and the winner pays the price displayed on the clock to the auctioneer.
When several identical goods are for sale, some options are open to the
seller, evenwhen themarket sticks to the descending price style as the basic
procedure. For instance, the seller must decide how to sell the remainder
of the goods after some buyer haswon one good. The remainder is brought
up to the auction again at the Ducth flower auctions,3 whereas at many
wholesale flower markets in Japan, the remainder is sold by the peculiar
method called mari.
Roughly speaking, mari allows other buyers who did not win the good
at the previous auction to apply for purchasing the remainder (if any) at the
same price as the winner in the previous auction paid. If the number of appli-
cants is less than the number of the remainder then all the applications are
accepted, while the remainder is randomly allocated between applicants
if the number of applicants exceeds the number of the remainder.
This paper investigates the eect of mari to the equilibrium outcome
of the auction. One interesting nature would be that when the number of
applicants exceeds the number of the remainder, the random allocation in
mari may cause ineciency: that is, some portion of the remaining goods
2In an interview at the Ota Floriculture Auction, a director who organizes the infor-
mation system of the auctioning room pointed out that they acutally have a “feeling” that
mari contributes to the economy of time at the market.
3Such situations in which the goods are sold sequentially are called “sequential auc-
tions” in the literature. The analysis of sequential auctions originates with Milgrom and
Weber [3] and Weber [4].
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may be allocated to the buyer whose value is lower among the applicants.
On the other hand,marimay contribute to the economy of time in the sense
that it decreases the number of auctions that should be held until all of the
remainder be sold out. The purpose of the paper is to show that addition of
mari to the sequential descending auction extensively reduces the number
of auctions to be held, while the loss of eciency is suciently small.
In investigating the relationship between eciency and economy of
time, there can be various ways of evaluating the trade-o. In this paper,
we define two measures, “eciency loss rate” (LR) and “round reduction
rate” (RR), and examines the asymtotic property of LR and RR when the
numbers of buyers and goods increase to infinity. LR is defined as the ratio
of the expected welfare loss in mari to the expected welfare if the goods
were to be allocated eciently. If such LR is closer to zero, we see that the
loss of eciency is smaller. RR, on the other hand, is defined as the ratio of
the expected number of goods sold inmari to the number of the remainder.
We regard that themari contributes more to the economy of time when RR
is closer to one. Our result actually shows that LR converges to 0 while RR
converges to 1 when the number of buyers and that of goods increase to
infinity (Theorem in page 19).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We formulate the sequen-
tial descending auction with mari in Section 2. In Section 3, we investigate
the symmetric equilibrium of the game and provide some characteristics.
Main result on the trade-o between eciency and economy of time is
presented in Section 4, in which we argue thatmari extensively reduces the
number of auctions while the loss of eciency is suciently small. Section
5 provides concluding remarks.
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2 The Model
In this section, we introduce the sequential descending auctionmodel with
mari.
To formulate the problem, suppose that there are k identical goods for
sale andN buyers. We assume that each buyer can buy only one item; that
is, we limit our attention to the unit-demand case. The goods are to be sold
in the following procedure:
1. The “auction clock” starts from a suciently high price and goes
down until one of the buyers stops it.
2. The buyer who stopped the clock wins the good at the price on the
clock.
3. Other buyers can apply to purchasing the remaining goods at the
same price being paid by the winner in step 2 (mari).
(a) If the number of buyers who applied to the purchase is greater
than the number of remaining goods (that is, k   1), then the
goods are allocated randomly between the applying buyers. Put
another way, if the number of applying buyers is j  k   1, then
each buyer wins the good with (ex ante) probability j=(k   1).
(b) Otherwise, all the applying buyers can win the good.
4. The remaining goods will be sold in the usual sequential descending
auction without mari.4
4In the real Japanese flower auctions,marimay happen for several times. That is, after
mari (step 3), the auctioning procedure simply goes back to step 1. The existence of mari
in and after the second round may aect how mari in the first round works. In order to
avoid such eects, in this paper we focus on a simplified game in which mari can come
up only in the first round.
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We let ti denote ith buyer’s type (value), and assume that the types are
independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [0; 1]. Each buyer
attains the payo of ti  p if the buyer wins the good and the winning price
is p, and the payo of 0 if the buyer fails to win the good. We assume that
the buyers are risk-neutral.
The strategy of the buyers comprises following components. One is the
decision about onwhat price the buyer stops the “auction clock” in the first
round (depending on her type t), another is the decision about whether to
apply in mari (depending on the price p in the first round and on her type
t), and the other is how to act in the sequential auction for the remaining
goods if she either does not apply or loses in mari (depending on the price
p, her type t, and the numbers of remaining buyers and remaining goods).
In this paper we focus on the symmetric equilibrium as in the following
form: there exist N;k and N;k such that (i) type-t buyer stops the clock at
N;kt in the first round, (ii) if the clock stopped at the price p = N;kt¯ in
the first round, then other buyers participate in mari if and only if the type
t is higher than N;kt¯, and (iii) the buyers follow symmetric equilibrium
strategies in the sequential descending auction in 4.
3 Equilibrium Strategy
In this section, we investigate the equilibrium strategy of buyers in the
auction withmari. We also provide some equations characterizing N;k and
N;k in the equilibrium,whichwill be extensively used in exlopring analysis
of the trade-o between eciency and economy of time in the next section.
In the beginning, we should obtain the symmetric equilibrium strategy
in the auctions after mari when there is still remainder of the goods. It
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is easily shown that the bidding strategy in the equilibrium after mari is
identical to that in the equilibrium of the usual sequential auction without
mari, which is provided as
bM;`(t) =
M   `
M
t; (1)
where M is the number of remaining buyers and ` is that of remaining
goods.5
Given the equilibrium strategy in the auctions after mari, bM;`(t), we
investigate the buyers’ decision about whether to apply in mari, for ar-
bitrarily fixed bidding strategy in the first round, . Suppose that type-t¯
buyer won the good in the first round, that is, the winner bid t¯ and won
the good with payment t¯. Then, in mari, each of remaining N   1 buy-
ers, whose types are independently distributed uniformly on [0; t¯), has a
chance to apply for purchasing the good at the price t¯.
Aswas noted in the previous section, we are now interested in the linear
symmetric equilibrium in which each buyer apply inmari if and only if the
buyer’s type is no less than t¯. To investigate the symmetric equilibrium,
in the following, we study one typical buyer’s decision whether to apply
in mari, given other N   2 buyers’ strategy .
If the buyer decides to apply inmari, the probability ofwinning the good
depends on the number of other applicants, j. If j < k   1, the buyer will
be able to win the good with probability one, whereas the buyer wins with
probability (k  1)=( j+ 1) if j  k  1. As each of other buyers apply in mari
with probability of 1    ex ante, the probability that the number of other
applicants equals to j is
 N 2
j

(1   ) jN 2  j, and therefore the probability
5See Milgrom and Weber [3] and Weber [4].
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that the buyer wins the good can be written as
k 2X
i=0
 
N   2
i
!
(1   )iN 2 i +
N 2X
i=k 1
 
N   2
i
!
(1   )iN 2 i k   1
i + 1
:
In the economy of notation, we write the expression as
E
1 
N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
in the following, where the function E1 m [ f ( j)] is defined as6
E
1 
m [ f ( j)] 
mX
i=0
 
m
i
!
(1   )im i f (i); (2)
and 1 is the indicator function.
To summarize, if the other buyers are following the mari participation
strategy , then the expected payo of the buyer with type t who decides
to apply in mari, denoted by m(t) would be
m(t) = (t   t¯)E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
; (3)
where t   t¯ is the ex post payo when the buyer successfully wins the
good inmari and theE thing represents the probability that the buyer wins
the good in mari.
If the buyer does not apply in mari, on the other hand, the expected
6E
1 
m [ f ( j)] can be understood as the expectation of function f ( j) when j follows the
binomial distribution with parameters 1    and m.
8
payo, denoted by w(t), can be written as
w(t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
E
1 
N 2
h
t   bN 1  j;k 1  j(t¯)

1 j<k 1
i
if t  t¯;
E
1 
N 2
hR t
0
xN 1  j;k 1  j

s
t¯

ds

1 j<k 1
i
if t < t¯:
(4)
We shall explain the two expressions in due order. For case of t  t¯,
the buyer’s optimal action in the auctions after mari (if any) is to act as if
type-t¯ buyer in the equilibrium. This is because there are no other buyers
with types more than t¯ in the auctions after mari as long as other buyers
are following . Moreover, this buyer will win with probability one in the
auction just after mari (if any). Hence, the expected payowhen this buyer
does not participate in mari can be written as in (4), where bM;`(t) is the
equilibrium strategy in the auctions after mari as given in (1).
For case of t < t¯, we define xM;`(s) is as
xM;`(s) 
` 1X
i=0
 
M   1
i
!
(1   s)isM 1 i: (5)
That is, xM;`(s) denotes the probability that type-s buyer is at least `-highest
amongM buyers whose types are independently drawn from the uniform
distribution over [0; 1].7
Here we have the following characterization of  in the equilibrium in
mari stage.
7Conceptually, the expected payo from deferring participation in mari is written in
more complex form than the one given in (4). In calculating the expected payo, we must
take into consideration all of the possibilities that the buyer wins the first after mari, the
buyer loses the first but wins the second after mari, and so forth. Given the symmetric
equilibrium strategy in the usual sequential descending auction following mari, which
is already given in (1), we can rewrite the (complex) expected payo as the simple form
given in (4).
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Proposition 1. Suppose that the buyers are taking first-round bidding strategy
 and type-t¯ buyer won the good in the first round. Then there exists unique
linear symmetric equilibrium inmari stage in which each of the remaining buyers
participates in mari if and only if the buyer’s type is no less than t¯, where  is
given as follows.
1. If   (N   k)=(N   1), then  = 1.
2. If 0 <  < (N   k)=(N   1), then  is the unique solution of
(1   )E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
=
k   1
N   1 : (6)
Proof. (Necessity). If  constitutes an equilibriumwhen 0 <  < (N k)=(N 
1), it must be that the expected payo of applying in mari and that of not
applying ((3) and (4), respectively) are indierent when the buyer’s type
is t¯. That is,
(t¯   t¯)E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
= t¯E1 N 2
"
k   1   j
N   1   j1 j<k 1
#
: (7)
Applying Lemma 2 in the Appendix, we have
E1 N 2
"
k   1   j
N   1   j1 j<k 1
#
=
1
N   1E
1 
N 1
h
(k   1   j)1 j<k 1
i
;
and
E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
= E
1 
N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
  1
N   1E
1 
N 1
h
j1 jk 1 + (k   1)1 j>k 1
i
:
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Substituting these two equations into (7) and rearranging yields
(1   )E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
=
1
N   1E
1 
N 1
h
(k   1)1 j<k 1 + j1 j=k 1 + (k   1)1 j>k 1
i
=
k   1
N   1 :
Thus we have equation (6). As the left-hand side is increasing in  by
applying Lemma 3 in the Appendix, and
E1N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
=
k   1
N   1 ; E
0
N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
= 1;
equation (6) has a unique solution for  in (0; 1) as long as 0 <  < (N  
k)=(N   1). For   (N   k)=(N   1),  = 1 follows from that the unique
solution for (6) is  = 1 when  = (N   k)=(N   1).
(Suciency). Next we show that the buyer whose type is more than
t¯ actually participates in mari as long as other buyers are following the
equilibrium strategy given in (6). If this buyer does not participate inmari,
the expected payo is (from (4))
w(t) = t  E1 N 2
h
1 j<k 1
i
+ B1;
where B1 is the term irrelevant of t. If this buyer decides to participate in
mari, on the other hand, the expected payo is (from (3))
m(t) = t  E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
+ B2;
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where B2 is again the term irrelevant of t. Thus, we have that
@
@t
m(t) >
@
@t
w(t)
for all t > t¯. As the two payos are indierent for type-t¯ buyer (that is,
m(t¯) = w(t¯) as shown in the necessity part), we have m(t) > w(t) for
all t > t¯, and thus we can conclude that the buyer whose type is more
than t¯ cannot be better o by absenting mari as long as other buyers are
following .
Finally we show that the buyer whose type t is less than t¯ does not
participate in mari as long as other buyers are following the symmetric
equilibrium strategy . For such t < t¯, we have
@
@t
w(t) = E
1 
N 2
"
xN 1  j;k 1  j
 
t
t¯
!
 1 j<k 1
#
;
from (4). We should note here that xN 1  j;k 1  j() is a sort of probability (see
(5)), and therefore we have
@
@t
w(t)  E1 N 2
h
1 j<k 1
i
(8)
for all t < t¯. As the two payos are indierent for type-t¯ buyer (as
shown in the necessity part), we can apply similar discussion as in the case
of t > t¯, and conclude that the buyer whose type is less than t¯ cannot
be better o by participating in mari as long as other buyers are following
. 
An informal interpretation of the equilibrium is as follows. Without
mari, a buyer who failed to win the good in the first round bids higher
in the next round than in the first, due to the deterioration of available
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supply relative to current demand.8 Hence, the buyer whose value is close
to t¯ would prefer to win the good in mari with price t¯ (although this is
higher than the buyer’s potential bid in the first round), rather to get into
the next round where the bid higher than t¯ might be required due to the
raise of competitiveness. This is what happens in 2. of the proposition. On
the other hand, if  is suciently high as in 1. of the proposition so that
the bidding higher than t¯ would not be needed in the following round
after mari even with the raise of competitiveness, then in the equilibrium
no buyers participate in mari ( = 1).
In what follows, we investigate the bidding strategy  in the first
round in the equilibrium, given the mari participation strategy provided
in Proposition 1. As will be shown in Proposition 2,  is actually less than
(N   k)=(N   1), and therefore participations in mari occur with positive
probability in the equilibrium.
In the first-period auction thedecisionproblem facing a buyer is slightly
more complex. Again let us take the perspective of one buyer with value t
and suppose that all other buyers are following the first-period strategy 
and mari participation strategy .
The equilibrium requires the buyer with type t to bid t in the first
stage, but consider what happens if the buyer bids s instead. Then the
buyer’s payo is
(s; t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
sN 1[t   s] + R z
s
m(t j u)duN 1 +
R 1
z
w(t j u)duN 1 if s < z
sN 1[t   s] + R 1
s
w(t j u)duN 1 if s  z
; (9)
8This eect is one aspect ofmartingale price path result in the usual sequential descend-
ing auction without mari. See Milgrom and Weber [3].
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where z = minft=; 1g, and m( j u) and w( j u) are those payos given
in (3) and (4), respectively, emphasizing that the type of the winner in the
first-round, u, is included in the function as t¯ = u. We shall explain the two
expressions in due order.
The first term results from the event that the buyer wins the good in
the first round. The second term of the first line results from the event that
the buyer loses in the first round but participates in mari, and u stands for
the highest type among other N   1 buyers (that is, the type of the buyer
who wins the good in the first round). The third term is the term resulting
from the event that the buyer loses the first round, does not participate in
mari and then finally wins the good in the auctions after mari.9
It is possible, however, that the buyer might bid suciently large price
in the first round so that when the buyer happens to lose in the first round
even with this high bid, it never becomes optimal for him to participate in
mari, as the type of thewinner in the first round is supposed to be extremely
high. The second line in the expression (9) corresponds to such biddings.
The first term results from the event that the buyer wins the good in the
first round, and the second term is the event that the buyer loses the first
round, does not (definitely) participate in mari and then finally wins the
good in the auctions after mari.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the buyer with type t bids t in the first
round and therefore the payo is calculated according to the first line in (9).
An increase in the bid of this buyer will increase the probability of winning
the good, but at the same time this will reduce the gain from the winning
in the first round (first term) as well as the gain from the event that the
9The buyer with suciently large type (t > ) always finds it optimal to participate in
mari whatsoever the first round price t¯ could be. For such buyers, the expected payo
(s; t) is calculated with z = 1, and the third term vanishes.
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buyer loses the first round but wins the good inmari (second term). To get
some idea about how these eects balance o, we begin with a heuristic
derivation of symmetric equilibrium strategies.
Dierentiating (s; t) with respect to s provides us with
@
@s
(s; t) = (N   1)sN 2  t   s   sN 1   m(t j s)(N   1)sN 2
= sN 2

(N   1) (t   s)   m(t j s)   s	
At a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order condition should be satisfied
in substituting s = t. That is, we have
(N   1) (t   t)   m(t j t)	 = t for all t. (10)
The left-hand side corresponds to the marginal benefit by an increment
of s, whereas the right-hand side corresponds to the marginal cost (the
marginal increment in payment), and the two eects are balanced o at the
point s = t. Substituting m(t j t) defined in (3), we have
(N   1)
(
(1   )   (1   )E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#)
= ; (11)
and by substituting (6), we have  = (N   k)=N.
The derivation of  is only heuristic because (11) is merely a necessary
condition that will be satisfied in the equilibrium. The next proposition
verifies that this constitutes the equilibrium and provides the full charac-
terization of .
Proposition 2. Symmetric equilibrium strategies in the sequential descending
auctionwithmari are given by the bidding strategy in the first round = (N k)=N
15
andmari participation strategy  given as the unique solution of
E
1 
N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
=
k   1
N   1
N
k
: (12)
Proof. Suppose that the otherN 1 buyers follow the strategy  = (N k)=N.
Consider a buyer with type t who is going to bid an amount s instead of
t. We are to show that
(t; t) > (s; t) for all s , t
by showing
@
@s
(s; t) > 0 for all s < t;
@
@s
(s; t) < 0 for all s > t:
For s < t, we have from (9) that
@
@s
(s; t) = (N   1)sN 2(t   s)   sN 1   m(t j s)(N   1)sN 2
= sN 2

(N   1)  t   s   m (t j s)   s	
As long as the other buyers are following the strategy , (10) is satisfied for
all t, and in particular, s = (N   1) (s   s)   m(s j s)	. Therefore,
@
@s
(s; t) = (N   1)sN 2  fs(t)   fs(s)	 ; (13)
where we defined fs(t) as fs(t) = t   s   m(t j s). It is easy to see that
f 0s (t) = 1   @@tm(t j s)
16
= 1   E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
> 0: (14)
Thus we can conclude that @(s; t)=@s > 0 for all s < t.
For t < s  z, the partial derivative is the same form as in (13), and we
have @(s; t)=@s < 0 for all t < s  z by (14).
For s > z, we can prove the result in a similar manner. We have the
derivative
@
@s
(s; t) = (N   1)sN 2 gs(t)   gs(s)	 ;
where gs(t) = t   s   w(t j s). As t= < s in this case, w(t j s) corresponds
to the second line of the definition in (4), and therefore
@
@t
w(t j s)  E1 N 2
h
1 j<k 1
i
< 1
from (8). Thus we have g0s(t) > 0 for all t, and @(s; t)=@s < 0 for all s > z.
We have established that
(t; t) > (s; t) for all s , t;
that is, the type-t buyer finds it optimal to bid t as long as other buyers
are following the strategy .
Substituting  = (N   k)=N into (6) yields the equation (12). 
4 Eciency vs. Economy of Time
In this section, we argue that mari extensively speeds up the market pro-
cedure at the cost of suciently small loss of eciency.
As shown in Proposition 2, in the symmetric equilibrium, participation
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in mari occurs with strictly positive probability. The possibility of random
allocation in mari causes ex ante ineciency, whereas selling several goods
at one time inmarimay contribute to the economy of time at themarket. To
formally evaluate the degree of ineciency as well as the level of economy
of time, we define two measures, the “eciency loss rate” (LR, hereafter)
and the “round reduction rate” (RR, hereafter). Formal (mathematical)
definitions of those two concepts will be given in the proof of Theorem
with some relevant notions to smoothen the outset of the proof. In the
following, we present casual definitions of the concepts and argue how the
trade-o of our interest can be investigated mathematically.
We refer to LR as the ratio of the expected eciency loss in mari to
the expected surplus when the goods are allocated eciently between the
participants. Thus, LR = 0 says that the goods will be allocated perfectly
eciently between buyers and hence there will be no loss of surplus in
mari (i.e., first best allocation), whereas LR = 1 would describe the situa-
tion where the latent surplus from the auction is totally vanished and the
resulting surplus is going to be zero.
On the other hand, RR is defined as the ratio of the expected number
of the goods sold in mari to k   1 (the number of remaining goods in the
beginning of mari). Thus, RR = 1 says that all of the remaining k   1
goods will be “cleaned up” at one time in mari, whereas RR = 0 refers to
the case where none of the remaining goods will be sold and mari has no
contribution to the economy of time in the auction process.
Figure 1 plots the values of LR and RR for various sets of parameters
2  k  10 and k + 1  n  5k. The point on the upper-left corner is for
the case of k = 2 and n = 3, while the one on the lower-right corner is
for the case in which k = 10 and n = 11. The figure shows that for most
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Figure 1: LR and RR
of the parameters, the LR tends to be small with relatively large values of
RR. Put in another way, the figure indicates that mari extensively speeds
up the market procedure (high RR) at the cost of suciently small loss of
eciency (low LR). For instance, van den Berg et al. [2] reports that k is
5.98 on average at the Aalsmeer Flower Auction in the Netherlands. The
figure shows for k = 6 that we have more than 80% of RR in exchange for
less than 1.5% of LR.
To formally investigate the tradeo between LR and RR, we have the
following convergence theorem.
Theorem. In the linear symmetric equilibrium of the sequential descending auc-
tion withmari, we have
LR ! 0 and RR ! 1 as N; k ! 1 with k
N
= :
Proof for LR ! 0. Let WN;k denote the expected surplus when the k   1
items are allocated eciently between N   1 buyers10, and WmN;k denote the
10In the beginning of the mari period, one unit out of k items is already sold to one
buyer out of N buyers, and therefore we are interested in how the remaining k   1 items
are to be allocated between the remaining N   1 buyers as far as we are concerned with
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expected surplus attained under the mari auction discussed in the paper.
Then the rate LR can be written as (WN;k  WmN;k)=WN;k. In what follows, we
are to prove LR ! 0 by showing 1   LR =WmN;k=WN;k ! 1 in N; k ! 1.
In accordance with the definition of WN;k, we let W

N;k( j) denote the
expected surplus when j buyers participate in mari and k   1 goods are
allocated eciently between them. In a similar way, we let WmN;k( j) denote
the expected surplus when j buyers participate inmari and k  1 goods are
allocated under the mari rule. Note that we have
WN;k = E
1 N;k
N 1
h
WN;k( j)
i
and WmN;k = E
1 N;k
N 1
h
WmN;k( j)
i
;
where N;k is the mari-participation threshold strategy in the equilibrium
with N buyers and k items (see Propositions 1 and 2; in what follows we
omit the subscripts N and k).
Our main interest is on j  k   1, in which case the resulting allocation
would be dierent between ecient allocation and mari. Suppose that, in
the first round, some buyer with value t¯ has pushed the button and won
the good. Now the values of remaining buyers are distributed on U[0; t¯],
and those buyers with values in [t¯; t¯] would participate in mari in the
equilibrium. Then for j  k   1, we have
WN;k( j) = t¯(k   1)
(
(1   )
 
1   k
2( j + 1)
!
+ 
)
;
WmN;k( j) = t¯(k   1)
1 + 
2
:
The first equation is the expected surplus when k   1 goods are allocated
the relative eciency of mari auction.
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eciently to the top k   1 buyers out of j participants11, and the second
equation is the expected surplus when k  1 goods are allocated randomly
between j participants, each of whose type is distributed on U[t¯; t¯] with
the expected value of t¯( + 1)=2.
Firstly, we have
WmN;k
WN;k
 w
m
N;k
WN;k
(15)
as a lower bound for 1   LR, where wmN;k denotes the expected surplus
generated by the event j  (1+)(k 1) in themari auction for a given small
number  > 0. In what follows, we decompose this lower bound as
wmN;k
WN;k
=
wN;k
WN;k
 w
m
N;k
wN;k
; (16)
where wN;k is similarly denoted as the expected surplus generated by the
event j  (1 + )(k   1) when the goods are allocated eciently between
j participants, and investigate each term’s further lower bound and its
asymptotic behavior.
For the relationship between wN;k andW

N;k, we have
WN;k = w

N;k + E
1 
N 1
h
WN;k( j)1 j>(1+)(k 1)
i
11Note that the expectation of ith order statistic in j draws from the uniformdistribution
U[t¯; t¯] is t¯ + (t¯   t¯)( j   i + 1)=( j + 1), and therefore we have
WN;k( j) =
k 1X
i=0
(
t¯ + (t¯   t¯) j   i + 1
j + 1
)
= t¯(k   1)
(
(1   )
 
1   k
2( j + 1)
!
+ 
)
:
Note also that the (unconditional) expected surplus if allocated eciently is calculated as
WN;k = t¯(k   1)
 
1   k
2N
!
:
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by the definition of wN;k. For (1+ )(k  1) < j  N  1, it is clear thatWN;k( j)
is at most
t¯(k   1)
(
(1   )
 
1   k
2N
!
+ 
)
;
and therefore a lower bound of wN;k=W

N;k is given by
wN;k
WN;k
 1  
(1   )

1   k2N

+ 
1   k2N
E1 N 1
h
1 j>(1+)(k 1)
i
; (17)
where the denominator in the second term comes from the fact thatWN;k =
t¯(k   1)(1   k=(2N)) (see footnote 11).
For wmN;k=w

N;k part in (16), we focus our attention to the event that
j  (1 + )(k   1). It is clear that
WN;k( j)  t¯(k   1)
(
(1   )
 
1   k
2((1 + )(k   1) + 1)
!
+ 
)
for each j  (1+)(k 1), and therefore a lower bound forwmN;k=wN;k is given
by
wmN;k
wN;k
 t¯(k   1)
1+
2
t¯(k   1)
n
(1   )

1   k2((1+)(k 1)+1)

+ 
o
= 1
, 
1 +
1   
1 + 
(k   1)
(1 + )(k   1) + 1
!
 1
, 
1 +
k=N
2   k=N
(k   1)
(1 + )(k   1) + 1
!
; (18)
where the last inequality comes from the condition that    = (N   k)=N
in the equilibrium.
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From (15), (16), (17), and (18), we have
1   LR  W
m
N;k
WN;k

1  
(1   )

1   k2N

+ 
1   k2N
E1 N 1
h
1 j>(1+)(k 1)
i
1 +
k=N
2   k=N
(k   1)
(1 + )(k   1) + 1
;
and by applying Lemma 4 in the Appendix,
lim inf
N!1 (1   LR) 
1
1 +

2   

1 + 
:
As  > 0 can be arbitrarily small, this completes the proof. 
Proof for RR ! 1. Our proof proceeds as follows: 1. we establish that
lim infN!1(1 )(N  1)=(k  1)  1, and 2. we show that RR ! 1 under the
condition derived in step 1. by applying Arratia-Gordon [1] method as in
the proof for LR ! 0. (that is, the expected number of buyers participating
in mari in the equilibrium, (1   )(N   1), converges to something slightly
greater than the number of remaining items, k   1).
1. Firstly we should note that the left-hand side of the equilibrium
condition (12) represents the probability that “a buyer wins the item in
mari if the buyer participates in it” in the equilibrium. Rearranging the
equation in terms of the probability that “a buyer loses inmari if the buyer
participates in it”, we have
1   E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
= 1   k   1
N   1
N
k
=
1   

1
N   1 ;
where  = k=N. As the event that “a buyer loses in mari if the buyer
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participates in it” is included in the event that “the number of other buyers
participating in mari is larger than k   1”,
E
1 
N 2
h
1 jk 1
i
 1   E1 N 2
"
1 j<k 1 +
k   1
j + 1
1 jk 1
#
:
Thus we have
E
1 
N 2
h
1 jk 1
i
 1   

1
N   1 : (19)
Given the inequality (19), we can show limN!1(1   )(N   2)=(k   1)  1
by contradiction. Specifically, we are to show that “if we suppose that
limN!1(1   )(N   2)=(k   1) < 1, then it contradicts the inequality (19)”.
Suppose that we have limN!1(1   )(N   2)=(k   1) < 1. Then we can
apply Lemma 1 (Arratia-Gordon Theorem) by seeing as p := 1    and
 := (k   1)=(N   2), and would have
E
1 
N 2
h
1 jk 1
i
 e (N 2)H:
This inequality would say that E1 N 2
h
1 jk 1
i
is the order of 1=eN, which
contradicts the inequality (19) stating that the left-hand side has no less
order than 1=N. Thus we have
lim
N!1
(1   )(N   2)
k   1  1:
2. RR can be written as follows:
RR =
E
1 
N 1
h
j1 j<k 1
i
+ E
1 
N 1
h
(k   1)1 jk 1
i
k   1 :
The first term in the numerator is regarding the event that j < k   1 in
which case the number of items sold in mari is only j, whereas the second
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term in the numerator is regarding the event that j  k   1 in which case
the number of items sold inmari is k  1, and the sum of these two terms is
divided by the number of remaining goods, k   1. We are to show RR ! 1
by firstly giving a lower bound for RR and then showing that the lower
bound converges to 1.
For any arbitrarily given number  > 0, we have
RR 
E
1 
N 1
h
0  1 j<(1 )(k 1) + (1   )(k   1)  1 j(1 )(k 1)
i
k   1 ;
= (1   )E1 N 1
h
1 j(1 )(k 1)
i
 (1   )E1 N 2
h
1 j(1 )(k 1)
i
= (1   )
n
1   E1 N 2
h
1 j<(1 )(k 1)
io
:
As we have limN!1(1   )(N   2)=(k   1)  1 established in step 1., we can
apply Lemma 1 (Arratia-Gordon Theorem) and have12
E
1 
N 2
h
1 j<(1 )(k 1)
i
 e (N 2)H ! 0 as N ! 1:
As  > 0 can be arbitrarily small, this completes the proof. 
5 Summary
In this paper we introduced themodel that formulates sequential descend-
ing auction with mari, and showed that it speeds up the market procedure
at the cost of suciently small loss of eciency.
Such mari rules are used in reality at various wholesale flower mar-
12From the symmetricity of binomial distributions, we can construct the “mirror” of
Arratia-Gordon Theorem as follows: If 0 <  < p < 1, then we haveEpN
h
1 jN
i
 e NH(;p).
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kets in Japan. We believe that the result in the paper provides a partial
justification for the introduction of the rule in other markets.
Appendix
Lemma 1 (Arratia-Gordon). If 0 < p <  < 1, then we have
E
p
N
h
1 jN
i
 expf N H(; p)g;
where H(; p) is the Kullback-Liebler distance satisfying
H(; p)   ln 
p
+ (1   ) ln 1   
1   p :
Proof. See Theorem 1 in Arratia and Gordon [1]. 
Lemma 2. For E1 m [ f ( j)]  Pmi=0  mi (1   )im i f (i), we have
E1 m [ f ( j)] =
1
m + 1
E
1 
m+1[(m   j + 1) f ( j)];
(1   )E1 m [ f ( j)] = 1m + 1E
1 
m+1[ j f ( j   1)]:
Proof.
E1 m [ f ( j)] =
mX
i=0
 
m
i
!
(1   )im i+1 f (i)
=
mX
i=0
 
m + 1
i
!
m   i + 1
m + 1
(1   )im i+1 f (i)
=
m+1X
i=0
 
m + 1
i
!
m   i + 1
m + 1
(1   )im i+1 f (i)
=
1
m + 1
E
1 
m+1[(m   j + 1) f ( j)]:
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Similarly,
(1   )E1 m [ f ( j)] =
mX
i=0
 
m
i
!
(1   )i+1m i f (i)
=
mX
i=0
 
m + 1
i + 1
!
i + 1
m + 1
(1   )i+1m i f (i)
=
m+1X
i=1
 
m + 1
i
!
i
m + 1
(1   )im+1 i f (i   1)
=
1
m + 1
E
1 
m+1[ j f ( j)]:

Lemma 3. If f ( j)  f ( j+1) for all j and f ( j) > f ( j+1) for some j, thenE1 m [ f ( j)]
is (strictly) increasing in .
Proof.
@
@
E
1 
m [ f ( j)] =
m 1X
i=1
 
m
i
! n
 (1   )i 1m i + (m   i)(1   )im i 1
o
f (i)
+mm 1 f (0)   (1   )m 1 f (m)
=
m 1X
i=0
( 
m
i
!
(m   i) f (i)  
 
m
i + 1
!
(i + 1) f (i + 1)
)
(1   )im i 1
=
m 1X
i=0
m!
i!(m   i   1)!(1   )
im i 1

f (i)   f (i + 1)
> 0:

Lemma 4. If N is large enough to satisfy k=N < (1+ )(k 1)=(N 1) for a given
 > 0, then
E1 N 1
h
1 j>(1+)(k 1)
i
! 0 as N ! 1:
27
Proof. In the equilibrium it should be that 1   1  = k=N, and therefore
we have
E1 N 1
h
1 j>(1+)(k 1)
i
 Ek=NN 1
h
1 j>(1+)(k 1)
i
:
If k=N < (1+)(k 1)=(N 1), then Lemma 1 can be applied, which provides
us with
Ek=NN 1
h
1 j>(1+)(k 1)
i
 e (N 1)H
 (1+)(k 1)
N 1 ;
k
N

;
where H is the Kullback-Liebler distance converging to a finite value as
N ! 1. 
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